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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The trial court erred in its determination that "as a matter of law" there 
would be no alimony awarded in the case based on the "deemed admitted" Request 
for Admissions which the Court determined created an enforceable Premarital 
Agreement. 
Standard of Review: Appellate review of a trial court's determination of the 
law is usually characterized by the term "correctness." Controlling Utah case law 
teaches that "correctness" means the Appellate Court decides the matter for itself 
and does not defer in any degree to the trial Judge's determination of law. State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-940 (Utah 1994) quoting State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 
(Utah 1993). There may also be appellate review, "when there is a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
5 
error, or the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings. . ." Elman v. 
Elman. 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002). 
2. Should the trial court have examined the statutory factors of alimony 
under Utah Code Section 30-3-5 and Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
regardless of the court ruling concerning the enforcement of the Premarital 
Agreement? 
Standard of Review: Trial judges are given "some discretion" in determining 
mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-40 (Utah 1994). 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony ... and will be 
upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. 
Breinholtv.Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995) quoting Howell v. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991). Failure to consider the Jones factors constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah 1986) and Rehn v. 
Rehn. 974 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999). Failure of a Trial court to make findings on 
all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgment. 
Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1990). The findings of fact 
6 
must show that the Court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is 
supported by the evidence. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). 
3. Did the Court err in granting Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgement on the day of trial and in denying Petitioner's Motion to Amend? 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment should be granted only if there has 
been a showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Book v. Attorney's Title 
Guar. Fund, 2001 UT13, Paragraph 28,20 P.3d 319 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, "we review the court's 
legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and review the facts and 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (citation 
omitted). When the facts are not in dispute, "we review the trial court's conclusions 
as to the legal effect of a given set of facts for correctness." Bradford v. 
Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 Paragraph 10, 993 P.2d 887 (citation omitted), cert, 
denied, Bradford v. Demita, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Section 30-3-35(7)(a)(i-iv) 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
7 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
Utah Code Section 30-8-6. Enforcement. 
1. A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against 
whom enforcement is sought proves that: 
(a) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or 
(b) the agreement was fraudulent when it was executed and, 
before execution of the agreement, that party: 
(i) was not provided a reasonable disclosure of the 
property or financial obligations of the other party 
insofar as was possible; 
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, 
any right to disclosure of the property or financial 
obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure 
provided; and 
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an 
adequate knowledge of the property or financial 
obligations of the other party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a divorce matter involving a Premarital Agreement that was executed 
by the parties one week prior to the marriage. The validity of the Premarital 
Agreement has been at issue since the inception of the case. 
8 
Disposition in Lower Court 
The trial court entered Second Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Second Revised Decree of Divorce on July 3, 2002. The Court also 
denied Petitioner's Motion for New Trial. 
Statement of Facts 
The main issues associated with the Premarital Agreement deal with 
Petitioner's claim against Respondent for alimony. 
At a Pre-Trial Settlement Conference held on July 31, 2001, Domestic 
Relations Commissioner Michael S. Evans noted in his Minute Entry that, "the 
Premarital Agreement is unenforceable due to the apparent deficiencies, it does not 
include a disclosure of assets." (R. at 77.) 
Just months after the Commissioner made his Pre-Trial finding, Petitionerfiled 
a motion with the Court regarding the enforcement of the Premarital Agreement and 
a hearing was heard before Commissioner Evans who then recommended and 
ordered by way of a minute entry that, "the Commissioner recommends that the 
Premarital document is invalid." (R. at 126.) 
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Neither party objected to the recommendation of the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner and by operation of law the recommendation of the Commissioner 
became an order of the Court (Rule 6-401(4), Rules of Judicial Administration). 
Approximately one month after the October 2001 hearing before the 
Commissioner, Respondent submitted discovery to the Petitioner by way of 
interrogatories, request for admissions, and request for production of documents. (R. 
at 129 and 130.) 
Petitioner's discovery answers were due to Respondent on December 24, 
2001. On December 20,2001 counsel for Petitioner requested an extension of time 
in which to answer discovery and Petitioner was confident an extension would be 
granted by Respondent since Petitioner had given Respondent an additional four 
months to answer Petitioner's initial discovery. Counsel for Respondent never 
responded. On Sunday, December 26, 2001, Respondent submitted a "Motion for 
Summary Judgement or in the Alternative Request for Pre-Trial" with the Court." (R. 
at 136.) 
On the day that the discovery was technically late, December 27, 2001, 
Petitioner submitted her Certificate of Service regarding her "Answers to Request for 
Admissions." (R. at 143.) 
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Over the next several months the parties submitted documents and letters to 
the Court requesting that the Court make a decision on Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Not until the day before trial did the Court instruct counsel that 
the Request for Admissions filed by the Respondent were "deemed admitted" due 
to the late filing by the Petitioner. 
In a telephonic conference, the Court instructed the parties that the trial would 
still need to go on as scheduled because the Petitioner still had a right to have her 
alimony claim adjudicated even though the Request for Admissions were "deemed 
admitted." This was spelled out in the Court's Minute Entry that was entered after 
the telephonic conference and signed by Judge Nehring prior to trial on May 1,2002. 
Specifically, the judge stated in the Order that, "Petitioner is bound by the matters 
addressed in Respondent's Requests for Admissions. I do not believe however, that 
these admissions conclusively foreclose the Petitioner from going forward with a 
claim for alimony." (R. at 212.) 
On the day of trial, May 1, 2002, the Court made a summary finding and 
decision that reversed both the previous order of the Court regarding the validity of 
the Premarital Agreement and the Minute Entry Order and found that since the 
l i 
request for admissions were "deemed admitted" that "as a matter of law, I am ruling 
that no alimony will be awarded in this case." (R. at 460, page 4 line 5.) 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THERE WOULD BE NO ALIMONY AWARDED IN 
THE CASE BASED ON THE "DEEMED ADMITTED" REQUEST FOR 
ADMISSIONS WHICH THE COURT DETERMINED CREATED AN 
ENFORCEABLE PREMARITAL AGREEMENT. 
Most of the facts are not in dispute. The Request for Admissions as put forth 
by Respondent were "deemed admitted" by the Court in the telephonic conference 
held between the Court and the parties' respective counsel the day before trial. 
In the telephonic conference, the Court determined Petitioner still would be 
allowed to move her case forward even though Respondent's Request for 
Admissions were "deemed admitted." The Court set forth the basis for this decision 
in a Minute Entry of the Court signed by the Judge on May 1, 2002. (R. at 212 and 
213) 
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Even though it is impossible to determine if the Judge signed this Minute Entry 
before or after the scheduled trial which was also held on May 1, 2002, it makes 
absolutely no sense that the Judge would sign this Minute Entry AFTER he ruled at 
trial that "as a matter of law there would be no alimony awarded in the case based 
on the "deemed admitted" Request for Admissions which the Court determined 
created an enforceable Premarital Agreement." 
There is no dispute that there was a Premarital Agreement signed by both 
parties. (R. at 24.) The question from day one has been whether the Agreement 
was enforceable or invalid under Utah law. 
Appellant has previously stated in her argument that six months prior to trial 
and before Respondent's Request for Admissions were ever submitted to Petitioner, 
the Court ruled that the Premarital Agreement was unenforceable. (R. at 126.) 
The Judge did not recognize that the Court had already ruled on the 
enforcement of the Premarital Agreement. On the scheduled day of trial, May 1, 
2002, the Court simply examined Respondent's Request for Admissions. 
Specifically, Respondent's Request for Admission No. 12 states, "Admit that you 
were advised of all the property owned by the Respondent prior to signing the 
Premarital Agreement." (R. at 140.) 
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The Court then stated, "based on the matters deemed admitted, it has been 
brought to my attention that the Premarital Agreement, the enforcement of which has 
been deemed admitted, includes a waiver of alimony. (R. at 460, page four, lines 1-
4.) 
There are absolutely no questions of the twelve Request for Admissions (R. 
at 139-140.) submitted by Respondent asking Petitioner for an admission or denial 
about the enforcement of the Agreement. The Court made a quantum leap in its 
ruling that the "deemed admitted" Admissions made the Premarital Agreement 
enforceable. 
The Court then made an additional error by ruling that, "as a matter of law, I 
am ruling that no alimony will be awarded in this case." (R. at 460 page 4, line 5 and 
6.) 
The Utah Court of Appeals had previously held in the case of Bradford v. 
Bradford. 199 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 887, "When the facts are not in dispute, we 
review the trial Court's conclusions as to the legal effort of a given set of... facts for 
correctness." 
Even though the Request for Admissions were "deemed admitted" there is no 
question asked in the Request for Admissions regarding the enforcement of the 
14 
Premarital Agreement. Further, even if the Premarital Agreement was enforceable, 
the Court had already ruled that, "I do not believe that these admissions conclusively 
foreclose the Petitioner from going forward with a claim for alimony. I have reached 
this conclusion because the matters deemed admitted do not fully address all of the 
elements necessary to conclude an evaluation of the propriety of alimony as set forth 
in Jones v. Jones. (R. at 212 and 213.) 
Additionally, a strict reading of the statute at Utah Code Section 30-8-6 lists 
when a premarital agreement is not enforceable. Specifically, at Section 1 (b)(ii) of 
the cited section it states that, "A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party 
against whom enforcement is sought proves that the agreement was fraudulent 
when it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, that party .. .did not 
voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclose of the property or 
financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided...." 
A close examination of the premarital agreement reveals that Petitioner did not 
expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclose of the property owned by the 




SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE EXAMINED THE STATUTORY 
FACTORS OF ALIMONY FOUND IN UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-5 
AND JONES V. JONES. 700 P. 2d 1072 (UTAH 1985) REGARDLESS 
OF THE COURT RULING CONCERNING THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE PREMARITAL AGREEMENT? 
As was previously noted, prior to the Court's ruling at the time of the 
scheduled trial, the Court had signed a Minute Entry stating that, "I do not believe, 
however, that these admissions conclusively foreclose the Petitioner from going 
forward with a claim for alimony." (R. at 212.) 
Even though the Court seemingly reversed this ruling1 the principle still stands: 
Should the statutory factors of alimony as set forth in Utah Code and Jones been 
examined by the Court and since these factors were not examined was the non-
examination an abuse of discretion by the trial Court? 
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals found in the case of Howell v. Howell. 806 
P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Court App. 1991) that, "the trial court abused its discretion 
by failing to enter specific findings on wife's financial needs and condition, and the 
1
 This Minute Entry was received by counsel on or about May 7, 2002. At first blush, 
counsel for Petitioner interpreted this ruling as being signed after the trial. Therefore, counsel for 
Petitioner thought that the Court was entering this order and reversing the decision made at trial. 
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pertinent facts in the record are not 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of judgement.'" 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, "Failure to consider the 
Jones factors constitutes an abuse of discretion (Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96,101 
(Utah 1986). 
POINT 3 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DAY OF TRIAL AND 
IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO AMEND ANSWERS TO 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS? 
Respondent filed his Motion for Summary Judgment or in alternative Pre-Trial 
on December 27,2001. Petitionerfiled her Answers to Request for Admissions with 
the Court on December 31, 2001. On two separate occasions, Respondent 
submitted to the Court a Notice to Submit for Decision With Addendum Exhibit. (R. 
at 145-146.) 
Petitioner submitted a letter to the Court through counsel wherein counsel 
pointed out to the Court that the Respondent's Notice to Submit was not properly 
being submitted to Judge Nehring and that Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be noticed for hearing before Commissioner Michael S. Evans. (R. 
at 154.) 
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In a defacto manner, Judge Nehring agreed since he never ruled on 
Respondent's Motion until the day of trial. In a technical sense, Judge Nehring 
never did rule on the Summary Judgment Motion, but his final decision on the day 
of trial was in all actuality, a ruling of summary judgment in favor of the Respondent. 
Quite literally, there was no trial held in the case because Judge Nehring 
claimed that "as matter of law" the Premarital Agreement was valid and enforceable. 
Petitioner submitted her Motion to Amend Answers to Requests for 
Admissions to the Court on the day of trial (See Addendum No. 1). Petitioner 
pointed out in her motion that the original responses to Respondent's Request for 
Admissions had been submitted on December 27,2001, a day after they were due. 
Since the Court had determined just before trial that the Request for 
Admissions were "deemed admitted" Petitioner had not filed her motion until that 
decision was rendered by the Court. 
It is critical to note that the specific Motion to Amend Answers to Request for 
Admissions as specifically mentioned by the Judge were not placed in the court file 
and therefore made part of the record. The fact remains that the document was filed 
and reviewed by the Court and the motion was denied (See Addendum No. 1). 
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The Court denied Petitioner's Motion to Amend at trial, stating that, "I've 
denied that motion because the Request for Admissions, which I have deemed 
admitted, carry with them implications concerning trial preparation and witness 
identification.. .the lawyers construe their case around what they have to prove and 
don't have to prove. And when an attempt is made to withdraw the matters deemed 
admitted literally on the day of trial, it is unduly prejudicial to the party who would 
have to reconfigure his or her case in order to accommodate the withdrawal of 
admissions. So I have denied that motion." (R. at 460, page 3, lines 15-25.) 
It is important to note that Respondent would not need to reconfigure his case 
because Petitioner had already submitted her answers to the discovery over four 
months earlier. Simply put, Petitioner was ready for her day in court and the Court 
never allowed trial to proceed due to its decision regarding the Premarital Agreemenl 
and its effect on the alimony issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the errors committed by the trial court, Petitioner requests that the 
trial court rulings be reversed. 
DATED this %Q day of CCTDfeCZ-^ 2003. 
David J Friel 
Attorney for Appellant 
19 
LJD 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be sent by U.S. mail, first class, postage pre-
paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on this SO day of 
October, 2003, to: 
David White 
5278 South Pinehill Business Park, 
Suite A200 
Murray, UT 84123 
B.Oif p 




David J Fnel 
Attorney for Petitioner 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Telephone (801)967-5500 
Facsimile (801)967-5563 
Bar No 6225 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JORETTA BUTTERFIELD, ) 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ; 
JAMES SHERWOOD BUTTERFIELD, ] 
Respondent 
I MOTION TO AMEND ANSWERS TO 
I REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
} Civil No 004906618DA 
) Judge Ronald E Nehnng 
) Commissioner Michael S Evans 
Petitioner, Joretta Butterfield, by and through counsel, David J Fnel, hereby moves 
the above-entitled Court to amend her requests for admissions in regards to Respondent's 
Request for Admissions submitted on or about November 19, 2001 
Two days before trial, on April 29, 2002, the Court ruled on Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment or in the alternative, Motion for pre-trial which had been filed on 
December 26, 2001 The Court informed counsel for both parties by way of a telephonic 
message that counsel for Petitioner received on April 29, 2002 that the Court had ruled on 
Respondent's request for admissions and that the Court had "deemed Respondent's 
request for admissions as admitted" 
In a telephonic pre-trial held on April 30, 2002, the Court reiterated its decision to 
grant Respondent's Motion and cited the Utah Supreme Court case of Langeland v. 
Monarch Motors, Inc. 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998), as case law on how to deal with a 
Motion to Amend or Withdraw Answers to Requests for Admissions. 
What is most unusual in this case is that Respondent filed his motion to have the 
admissions "deemed admitted" just one or two days after they were due. This must be 
considered since Petitioner had graciously allowed Respondent several extensions to 
submit Answers to Petitioner's discovery which ended up being received by the Petitioner 
approximately four months after it was due. 
Therefore, in accord with Langeland, Petitioner will attempt to show that the matters 
deemed admitted against Petitioner are relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of 
action. Petitioner submits the following: 
1. Out of the 13 requests for admissions (there are actually two number 
nine requests for admissions) only two of the "deemed admitted" questions are relevant to 
the merits of the underlying cause of action. First, question number nine asks, "Admit that 
the Respondent has paid over $7,000 in payments on your condo." Respondent has 
requested that Petitioner reimburse Respondent for a total of approximately $10,000 that 
Respondent allegedly paid Petitioner during the marriage. 
2. Petitioner specifically denied this request for admission in her answers 
to requests for admissions that were filed on or about December 27,2001 (See Exhibit No. 
1). If Respondent does not move forward at trial in an attempt to re-coop these monies 
2 
that Respondent allegedly paid, this matter will not be relevant to the merits of the 
underlying cause of action If Respondent continues in his request for reimbursement for 
these funds, the issue of the admission will be relevant in regards to the division of assets 
which is to be determined at trial 
3. Petitioner has executed an affidavit indicating that this issue which has 
been deemed admitted is in fact untrue and Petitioner has the ability to prove that the 
admission is not true 
4 Question No 12 of the Request for Admissions states, "Admit that you 
were advised of all property owned by the Respondent prior to signing the pre-nuptial" 
This has been deemed admitted by the Court and the issues are relevant to the merits of 
the underlying cause of action due to their being a signed and executed pre-nuptial 
agreement which was signed by the parties on May 20,1998 The pre-nuptial agreement 
has been used by the Respondent as a means in attempting to not pay any alimony to the 
Petitioner The pre-nuptial agreement specifically states that, "Further, each party waive 
any claim to alimony in the even of separation or divorce " The pre-nuptial agreement is 
relevant to the merits of the case in regards to alimony Under the Jones factors of 
alimony, Petitioner does have need for alimony and Respondent has the ability to pay 
alimony 
5 Further, Petitioner is submitting an affidavit with this motion with 
specific facts indicating that the matter of the pre-nuptial agreement being deemed 
3 
n 
admitted is in fact untrue. Petitioner submits her affidavit in support of this motion which 
is being filed concurrently with this document. 
DATED this 3<- day of Atlti^- . 2002. 
David J Friel ' 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be sent via facsimile a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on this £ c day of A f f iUL 2002 to: 
Sylvia Colton 
1206 West South Jordan Parkway, Unit B 
South Jordan, UT 84095-4551 
Facsimile No. (801) 446-5500 
n &°~ei-P 
C Buttemeld mot4 
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David J Friel 
Attorney for Petitioner 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Facsimile: (801) 967-5563 Bar No. 6225 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




JAMES SHERWOOD BUTTERFIELD, 
Respondent. 
ANSWERS TO REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 004906618DA 
Judge: Ronald E. Nehring 
Commissioner: Michael S. Evans 
you were laid off from your last employment 
Petitioner,JorettaButterfie,d,byandthroughcounse,,Dav^ 
the following answers to Request for Admissions: 
1
 R I Q J J K T N O l : Admit that 
prior to marriage. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
2- R I Q U S L N O ^
 A d m i t t h a t y o u d | d n o ( q u j t ^ ^ . ^ ( o 
Respondent. 
MSWER: Admit. 
3. REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that you had substantial health problems prior to 
marriage to the Respondent. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
4. REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that you are now employed, and were not employed 
prior to marriage to the Respondent. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
5
- REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that the Respondent told you that he would only 
spend $5,000 for a wedding ring. 
ANSWER: Objection. The wedding ring that Respondent gave to Petitioner 
was a gift and the amount spent on the ring has absolutely no relevance to this case. 
6. REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that you agreed to pay $3,000 on your wedding ring 
if the Respondent would buy you an $8,000 ring. 
ANSWER: Objection. Please see answer to No. 5. 
7. REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that the Respondent did buy you a $8,000 wedding 
ring. 
ANSWER: Objection. Please see answer to No. 5. 
8. REQUEST NO. 8: Admit to date that you have not paid the Respondent 
anything on your wedding ring. 
ANSWER: Objection. Please see answer to No. 5. 
9. REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that the Respondent has paid over $7,000 in 
payments on your condo. 
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ANSWER: Deny. 
9.[sic] REQUEST NO. 9fsic1: Admit that you went on a cruise with the Respondent. 
ANSWER: Admit. 
10. REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that you agreed to help pay for said cruise costs. 
ANSWER: Objection. This request has no relevance to the issues at hand. 
11. REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that you have not paid anything towards said 
cruise costs to the Respondent. 
ANSWER: Objection. Please see answer to No. 10. 
12. REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that you were advised of all property owned by the 
Respondent prior to signing the pre-nuptial agreement. 
ANSWER: Deny. 
DATED this 1/1 day of C E Z ^ n B e f c ^ 2001. 
David J Friel 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document on this "i"\ day of DecgfttPff^ 2001, by United States mail, first class, 
postage pre-paid, to: 
Sylvia Colton 
1206 West South Jordan Parkway, Unit B 
South Jordan, UT 84095-4551 
C Butterfield ans 
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DAVID J FRIEL 
ATTORNEY & COUNSELOR AT LAW 
4059 SOUTH 4000 WEST 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UT 84120 
TELEPHONE: (801) 967-5500 
FACSIMILE: (801) 967-5563 
December 20, 2001 
Sylvia Colton 
1206 West South Jordan Parkway, Unit B 
South Jordan, UT 84095-5512 
RE: Butterfield v. Butterfield, Case No. 004906618DA 
Dear Sylvia: 
You are picking up right where opposing counsel left off by making by insulting remarks 
about my client. This does not help the matter but drives a further wedge between the clients and 
our ability to reach some type of resolution. I thought you might be above relaying your client's and 
his family's insulting remarks. 
As a fairness issue, how do you think the Court is going to view your denying me the 
opportunity to set a deposition of your client and at the same time you have sent extensive 
discovery in regards to interrogatories, request for admissions, and request for production of 
documents. I would imagine that the Court would award me attorney fees for your unreasonable 
position on this issue if I have to set a hearing before Commissioner Evans. 
Finally, my records indicate that discovery is due to your offices on December 24, 2001. 
Due to the holidays, my client is going to need an extension of time in which to respond to your 
discovery. Please let me know your position on this issue. I will wait to hear from you. 
Sincerely, 
David J Friel 
Attorney at Law 
DJFMaf 
cc Joretta Butterfield 
C Butterfield It15 
David J Friel 
Attorney for Petitioner 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Facsimile: (801) 967-5563 
Bar No. 6225 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JORETTA BUTTERFIELD, 
Petitioner, ] 
\ /c > 
V o . 
JAMES SHERWOOD BUTTERFIELD, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER IN 
I SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND 
I ANSWERS TO REQUEST FOR 
I ADMISSIONS 
) Civil No. 004906618DA 
) Judge: Ronald E. Nehring 
) Commissioner: Michael S. Evans 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Joretta Butterfield, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled action. 
2. This affidavit is in support of my Motion to Amend Answers to Requests for 
Admissions which I am filing concurrently with this affidavit. 
3. I am willing to testify in a court of law concerning the truthfulness of the 
statements made in this affidavit. 
4 I have been informed by my attorney that the Court has ruled that 
Respondent's request for admissions have been "deemed admitted" by the Court There 
are specific facts which have been deemed admitted which are untrue 
5 First, Respondent has not paid $7,000 in payments on my condo For the 
duration of our marriage when I lived with Respondent in his home, I had renters in my 
condo The renters were paying rent that went towards the condo payment There was 
only one or two occasions when Respondent loaned me money and I repaid the loan 
proceeds back to him There is absolutely no way that Respondent made $7,000 in 
payments on my condo during the time that we were residing together 
6 Second, Respondent is claiming that he gave me full disclosure in regards 
to the extent of his property prior to execution and signing the pre-nuptial agreement in 
May, 1998 This could not be further from the truth When I met with the Respondent and 
his son, Cleon Butterfield, on May 20, 1998 we had lunch at the Coachmen During the 
lunch, I was presented with a pre-nuptial agreement and we discussed Respondent's 
desire that we both sign a pre-nuptial agreement At absolutely no time prior to signing 
the pre-nuptial agreement, did Respondent or his son, Cleon Butterfield. describe 
to me the nature and extent of Respondent's property. Even though it was 
mentioned that there were some family trusts. I was given absolutely no information 
in regards to the holdings of the Respondent or the value of any holdings I have 
read information and statements from the Respondent and his son that indicate the exact 
2 
opposite. I have read that they claim they told me the specific property and holdings of the 
Respondent and that I had full information and knowledge concerning the extent of those 
properties and trusts. 
THE REST OF THIS PAGE IS LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK. 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
•55 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Joretta Butterfield, being first duly sworn and under oath, deposes and says that she 
is the Petitioner in the above-entitled action; that she has read the foregoing document, 
and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true of her own knowledge, 
information and belief. 
Jqjfetta Butterfield
 f/ , 
2002. S U B S C R I B E D A N D SWORN TO before me this J^_ dayof ApfUC 
j g g . :«&}«&:---i 
*W$$M ^->»o^,vr,- ; NOTARY PUBLIC 
- • ^ ' f r ^ . . v&fttL Residing in Salt Lake County 
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CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be sent via facsimile, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on this '^0 day of AijClL^ , 2002, to: 
Sylvia Colton 
1206 West South Jordan Parkway, Unit B 
South Jordan, UT 84095-4551 
Facsimile No. (801) 446-5500 
£\„p(L-p 
C Butterfield aff2 
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